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I. INTRODUCTION
The Misapplication Statute' imposes criminal penalties on any
bank officer, director, agent, or employee who willfully misapplies
1. The Misapplication Statute provides:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any capacity
with any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or insured bank, or a
receiver of a national bank, or any agent or employee of the receiver, or a Federal
Reserve Agent, or an agent or employee of a Federal Reserve Agent or of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully
misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of such bank or any moneys, funds
assets or securities intrusted to the custody or care of such bank, or to the custody or
care of any such agent, officer, director, employee or receiver, shall be fined not more
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bank assets exceeding one hundred dollars.' Section 656 is one of
the most useful tools for prosecuting insider misconduct in the
banking industry.' The federal government's recent willingness to
prosecute bank insider misconduct 4 has resulted in increased reli-
ance on the Misapplication Statute in the federal courts.
To sustain a section 656 conviction, the government must
prove four elements: (1) that the accused was an officer, director,
agent, or employee of a bank; (2) that the bank was a national or
federally insured bank; (3) that the accused willfully misapplied
the bank funds; and (4) that the accused acted with the intent to
injure or defraud the bank." The prosecutor generally is able to
establish the first two elements of the misapplication crime
through the use of uncontested evidence. By examining relevant
bank documents" and the defendant's actionsJ the prosecutor can
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; but if the amount embez-
zled, abstracted, purloined or misapplied does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982).
2. Section 656 does not apply to state chartered banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See 12 U.S.C. § 221
(1982).
3. Other statutes that the government frequently relies on to prosecute bank insiders
include: 18 U.S.C. §§ 215 (receipt of commissions or gifts for procuring loans), 371 (conspir-
acy to commit offense or to defraud the government), 655 (theft by bank examiner), 1005
(false statements by bank officer), 1014 (false statements on loan and credit applications)
(1982).
4. See O'Malley, The Federal Criminal Liability of Bank Personnel Under the Mis-
application Statute, 99 BANKING L.J. 100, 102 (1982).
5. See United States v. Broome, 628 F.2d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 858 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979); United States v.
Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1024 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
6. See Cox, Sinister Hybrid-Civil Constraint and Criminal Liability, 96 BANKING
L.J. 834, 837 (1979).
7. Judge Friendly, in United States v. Docherty, 468 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1972), provided
several examples of illegal bank employee activity.
Willful misapplication has been found, for example, when a bank employee knowingly
engaged in a check 'kiting' scheme for the benefit of depositors, when a bank employee
paid money out to a customer on a check he knew was backed by insufficient funds and
then concealed the overdraft, when a bank officer loaned money without security know-
ing that the borrower could not repay, when a depositor repeatedly overdrew his ac-
count, knowing that the branch manager was consistently ignoring this, when a bank
officer caused his bank to borrow from another and pocketed the proceeds, leaving his
own bank only with a personal note of an employee of the lending bank which he had
no reason to think would be paid, and, as we have recently held, when a bank officer
pocketed the proceeds of loans knowingly issued on the strength of fraudulent loan
applications.
Id. at 994 (citations omitted).
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prove the third element of the crime.' To establish the fourth ele-
ment, which constitutes the mens rea component of the crime, the
prosecutor must deduce the defendant's motives and intentions.9
Because of the enormous difficulty in producing evidence to prove
the defendant's actual intentions, the hardest task in a section 656
prosecution is demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted with the intent to injure or defraud the bank.10
Courts have failed to resolve the problem of determining the
proper standard of proof that is necessary to establish whether the
defendant intended to injure or defraud the bank in a section 656
case. In recent years, the banking industry has become the subject
of much scrutiny." As a result of the recent instability of the
financial industry and the alarming increase in the number of bank
failures, 12 federal courts have had ample opportunity to reexamine
8. The prosecutor may introduce objective evidence such as bank ledgers and bank
officers' appointment books to show that something is awry in the handling of bank funds
and that the suspected officer was physically capable of committing the willful
misapplication.
9. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 739-47 (2d ed. 1969) (discuss-
ing mens rea).
10. The National Bank Act of 1864 contained the first formulation of the Misapplica-
tion Statute. Section 5209 of the Act provided:
And be it further enacted that every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent
of any association, who shall embezzle, abstract, or willfully misapply any of the mon-
eys, funds, or credits of the association . . .shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment not less than five nor
more than ten years.
National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 55, 13 Stat. 116. The substance of the Act is retained
in § 656. See supra note 1 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 656). Congress amended the 1864 Act specifi-
cally to include the requirement of a showing of "intent. . . to injure or defraud" the asso-
ciation. Rev. Stat. U.S. § 5209, as amended Sept. 26, 1918, ch. 177, § 7, 40 Stat. 972.
Although the 1948 revision of Title 18 omitted the words "with intent to injure or de-
fraud," see Morse, Bank Insiders and the Willful Misapplication Statute: Toward More
Effective Protection from Self-Dealing, 92 BANKING L.J. 715, 725-26 (1975), courts, never-
theless, continue to require proof of mens rea as an element of a § 656 crime. See, e.g., Seals
v. United States, 221 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v. Logsdon, 132 F. Supp.
3, 5 (W.D. Ky. 1955), aff'd, 253 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958). Congress eliminated the intent
wording in an attempt to clarify the original version that critics had attacked as verbose,
redundant, and complicated. Id.; see also Historical and Revision Notes, 18 U.S.C. § 656
(1982). Today, virtually all courts require the prosecution to demonstrate intent to injure or
defraud as an element of a § 656 case. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215,
1218 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Luke, 701 F.2d 1104, 1108 (4th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 116 (1983); Her-
nandez v. United States, 608 F.2d 1361, 1364 (10th Cir. 1979). But see United States v.
Twiford, 600 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 701
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
11. Scherschel & Black, Bankers: Everybody's Favorite Target, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Apr. 11, 1983, at 27.
12. Over 100 banks have failed in the last 20 years. Nine of the 10 largest U.S. bank
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the question of insider misconduct. 13 The United States circuit
courts, however, continue to disagree over whether a finding of
"recklessness"' 14 satisfies the criminal intent requirement of section
656.' Despite attempts by circuit judges and legal scholars to de-
sign a uniform approach to section 656 violations, courts are split
in their interpretations of the appropriate mens rea standard.
This Recent Development advocates legislative adoption of a
new Misapplication Statute as a long range solution to the courts'
continued debate over the appropriate mens rea standard and ju-
dicial adoption of a uniform approach as a short run alternative.
Part II of this Recent Development traces the various mens rea
standards that courts have applied under the Misapplication Stat-
ute. Part III discusses the current confusion over the appropriate
section 656 mens rea standard by looking at three recent circuit
court decisions.' 6 Part IV advocates the adoption of a new Misap-
plication Statute similar to the approach that the National Com-
mission on Reform of Criminal Laws suggests in its proposed revi-
sions to Title 18. This approach delineates three categories of
offenses, each corresponding to a different level of culpability and
punishment. Part IV also suggests that until Congress drafts a new
Misapplication Statute, the courts should establish a uniform stan-
dard for section 656 mens rea that restricts prosecution only to
defendants who possess the traditional mens rea of knowledge.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Misapplication Statute to enable the
prosecution of a variety of offenses.' 7 Prosecutors have used the
failures have occurred in the last 12 years. J. SINKEY, FINANCIAL CRISES: INSTITUTIONS AND
MARKETS IN A FRAGILE ECONOMY 24-41 (E. Altman & W. Sametz ed. 1977).
13. See O'Malley, supra note 4, at 100-02.
14. The recklessness standard holds that the "[rieckless disregard of the interests of
the bank is equivalent to intent to injure or defraud." United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d
1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1024 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.) (survey of the applica-
ble standards in different circuits), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 116 (1983); Morse, supra note 10,
at 727-30.
16. Within the span of eight days in March 1983, three circuit courts rendered deci-
sions concerning the appropriate mens rea standard under the Misapplication Statute. See
United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Luke, 701 F.2d
1104 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 116 (1983).
17. One commentator suggested that Congress specifically provided the broad lan-
guage of "willful misapplication" to encompass a wide range of insider misconduct. See
Morse, supra note 10, at 739.
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statute in a number of insider misconduct situations ranging from
kickback schemes to account overdrafts.' To maintain the flex-
ibility that is necessary to sustain section 656 convictions in such
disparate fact situations, courts have had to adopt different mens
rea standards to satisfy the requisite section 656 intent to injure or
defraud. Courts' failure to articulate with consistency the precise
mens rea standard that they apply has prevented the establish-
ment of a single mens rea test.
A. The Objective Standard of Intent
In recent years, judicial interpretations of section 656 mens
rea suggest that criminal misapplication has evolved into "virtually
a strict liability offense."'19 By adopting the position that juries
may presume the intent to injure or defraud from the defendant's
admission that he performed a certain act, even though he was un-
aware that the act was detrimental to the bank, the federal courts
have created an objective standard of intent.20 Rather than con-
sider the defendant's subjective intent, courts infer intent from his
objective overt actions. Thus, a prosecutor using this approach
may prove the mens rea element of a misapplication offense
merely by showing that the accused bank officer performed certain
acts as part of his job.2'
Although courts have resisted labelling the application of the
mens rea requirement as an objective standard, a review of court
decisions addressing this issue indicates judicial acceptance of the
broad objective test for section 656 intent. For example, in United
States v. Southers22 the court upheld a section 656 criminal con-
viction of a bank officer whose credit decisions did not accord with
established banking custom.2 3 In reaching this decision, the court
18. See supra note 7.
19. Cox, supra note 6, at 837.
20. See id. at 838. For example, when a bank officer makes a loan to a third party that
the officer believes is creditworthy, the officer knows that he has completed the physical act
of making the loan. The officer, however, may have no actual knowledge that the third party
is using the officer illegally to procure bank funds. Courts, nevertheless, may impose § 656
liability on the bank officer for making "risky loans" to a noncreditworthy party.
21. See United States v. Kernoodle, 367 F. Supp. 844 (M.D.N.C. 1973), af'd, 506 F.2d
1398 (4th Cir. 1974). For example, in a prosecution of bank officers for approving financially
unsound loans, the government merely had to demonstrate that the defendant performed
"several overt acts relating to issuing or cashing checks, and making loans." Id. at 850.
22. 583 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1978).
23. As an authorized officer, the defendant had issued and signed six cashier's checks
for a total of $15,900. Two of the checks were payable to the defendant, three were payable
to his creditors, and one was payable to a third party who had exhausted his credit limit at
1984] 1401
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
refused to consider that all the loans which the officer made were
repaid, that the officer continuously acted in what he perceived to
be the bank's best interests, and that the bank actually may have
profited from the officer's actions.24 The court adopted an objective
standard for finding section 656 intent and looked solely at the of-
ficer's overt conduct in holding that he acted with the intent to
injure or defraud the bank.2 5 Consequently, under the Southers ra-
tionale, once the prosecution establishes the first three elements of
the misapplication offense,26 the judge may instruct the jury to
presume the intent to injure or defraud from the fact that the of-
ficer knowingly committed the acts in question.2 7
Similarly, in United States v. Reynolds2s the court permitted
the jury to infer that the defendant had intended to defraud or
injure the bank when he deviated from the bank's normal check
clearing process. The court found a presumption of the requisite
intent from an objective view of the defendant's actions, even
though the defendant contended that he had followed the bank
president's orders and believed that he was acting in the bank's
best interest.29 Southers and Reynolds evidence the recent trend in
misapplication cases towards relaxing the standard that is neces-
sary to obtain criminal indictments and convictions.3 0 Judicial ap-
plication of the objective standard of intent in banking, a business
in which violations are easy to document because of bank records,31
has resulted in an unusually high conviction rate for violations of
the Misapplication Statute.2
the bank. The parties receiving the checks gave neither payment nor security, "contrary to
banking custom." Id. at 1304.
24. See id. at 1302; see also United States v. Tidwell, 559 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); United States v. Acree, 466 F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973); United States v. Kernoodle, 367 F. Supp. 844
(M.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1974).
25. Southers, 583 F.2d at 1305.
26. See supra text accompanying note 5.
27. See Southers, 583 F.2d at 1306-07; Cox, supra note 6, at 837-38.
28. 573 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1978).
29. Id. at 244-45.
30. See Morse, supra note 10, at 729-30 & n.49. The author explains, "This relaxation
derives not only from the general relaxing of the old technical forms of criminal pleading
... but is also seen as an increased willingness of courts to accept an allegation of willful
misapplication with fewer specifics." Id. (citations omitted).
31. Cox, supra note 6, at 840.
32. Assistant United States Attorney Kevin O'Malley has compiled statistics that evi-
dence an amazing 97.5% conviction rate for accused § 656 violators that federal grand juries
indicted in fiscal year 1980. O'Malley, supra note 4, at 101.
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B. Knowingly Versus Recklessly
Courts have rendered inconsistent decisions concerning
whether the defendant must have acted knowingly or in reckless
disregard of the bank's interests to satisfy the section 656 mens rea
requirement. Some circuit courts have upheld jury instructions
equating the intent to injure with mere reckless disregard of the
bank's interest.13 Using this formulation, the court determines
whether the bank officer's actions were reckless rather than
whether the bank officer possessed actual criminal intent. The
court's hindsight analysis of the defendant's conduct controls the
finding of guilt or innocence under the recklessness standard.'
Two distinct problems arise when a court allows the reckless-
ness standard to satisfy the criminal intent requirement of section
656. First, assuming that knowledge is the proper mens rea for a
felony conviction under section 656, 35 the court's practice of hold-
ing that recklessness is equivalent to knowledge violates constitu-
tional due process. The due process clause36 requires a prosecutor
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the criminal
charge.37 Criminal intent is an established element of misapplica-
tion of funds under section 656.38 The Supreme Court consistently
has held that "[a] presumption which would permit but not re-
quire the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would
prejudice a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own voli-
33. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166, 1174 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664,
667-68 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 868 (1978); Giragosian v. United States, 349 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1965); Logsdon
v. United States, 253 F.2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1958).
34. For example, a court may find a bank president guilty of a § 656 felony if, in
approving the temporary transfer of bank funds to cover defaulting loans, he acted reck-
lessly, reven though he clearly had no intent to injure or defraud the bank. See, e.g., United
States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 116 (1983).
35. See United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 956-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 116 (1983) (a general review of the legislative history of § 656 and Supreme Court and
circuit court opinions on the subject establishing that knowledge is the appropriate mens
rea standard for § 656).
36. The due process clause of the United States Constitution provides "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). According to the Supreme Court: "Lest their
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged." Id. at 364; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
38. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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tion.' '3 9 Consequently, any court that allows the presumption of
section 656 mens rea from the defendant's reckless conduct is re-
moving both a critical decision from the jury and the necessary
burden of proof from the prosecution. 40 Thus, by equating the
lesser mens rea standard of recklessness with the higher mens rea
standard of knowledge, courts may violate the due process clause.41
Second, the recklessness approach to section 656 presents seri-
ous difficulties for bank officers. Under the recklessness standard,
bank officers must analyze each activity that they plan to under-
take to try to anticipate any risk of loss to the bank. If a transac-
tion potentially may result in a loss to the bank, which is always
possible in daily banking operations,42 the bank officer should re-
fuse to complete the transaction or prepare for a criminal sentence
if a court finds that he acted recklessly. 43 Courts that have adopted
the recklessness standard for willful misapplication must decide to
what extent they will prosecute bankers for engaging in risk-taking
activities as a normal function of their occupation.
Several circuit courts have refused to accept any mens rea
standard less than knowledge for purposes of satisfying section 656
39. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952) (defendant, charged with
willful and knowing theft of government property, wrongfully convicted when the trial judge
allowed a presumption of intent from the defendant's act); see also Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510, 513 (1979) (defendant, charged with deliberate homicide, prejudiced when the
trial judge instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts"); United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422,
438 (1978) (defendants charged with criminal violations of the Sherman Act successfully
challenged a jury instruction that the law presumes a person intends the necessary conse-
quences of his acts).
40. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 199 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
41. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-23; Adamson, 700 F.2d at 956.
42. One commentator noted, "With regard to credit extension, it is arguable that every
decision to make or extend a loan creates some risk of loss or injury to the bank." Morse,
supra note 10, at 729 (emphasis in original).
43. Generally accepted banking practices justify the extension of loans that are risky
and even loans that eventually will turn sour. M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 296 (1974).
In early misapplication cases, courts distinguished between acts of "maladministration"
and acts of "misapplication." Justice Woods, writing for the Supreme Court in United
States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655 (1882), outlined the heightened requirements associated with
prosecution under the Misapplication Statute. Id. at 668. Justice Woods warned that if the
court permitted prosecutions when the defendant did not possess the specific intent to de-
fraud the bank through conversion of bank funds, "every official act of any officer, clerk, or
agent of a banking association, by which its funds are applied in a way not authorized by
law, would be punishable under sect. 5209 [now 18 U.S.C. § 656]." Id. at 667. Justice Woods'
strict line of demarcation between acts of maladministration and acts of misapplication no
longer exists. Consequently, judges and prosecutors often overlap the concepts of maladmin-
istration and misapplication when dealing with modern § 656 violations.
1404
MISAPPLICATION STATUTE
criminal intent.44 The prosecution can meet the knowledge stan-
dard by proving that the bank officer knowingly and voluntarily
injured or defrauded the bank.45 The mens rea distinction between
knowledge and recklessness becomes most apparent in credit allo-
cation decisions and other lending situations. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a
bank officer's conviction for lending money to a financially capable
borrower who planned to distribute the funds to a third party46
and held that criminal responsibility under section 656 requires
knowledge that the named borrowers were financially incapable of
affording the loans. 47 Even though the bank officer's act of lending
might have been reckless, the court held that section 656 calls for
the higher mens rea standard of knowledge.48
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the reckless-
ness standard and held that conduct that "might be viewed as na-
ive and perhaps reckless" does not constitute sufficient knowledge
to support a criminal conviction.49 Recently, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld a jury conviction of misapplication when the court deter-
mined that the accused bank official knowingly and voluntarily
had arranged for and accepted loans in amounts large enough to
pose a serious threat of harm to the financial stability of the lend-
ing institution.50 The views of the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, 51 in comparison with the circuit courts that embrace a reck-
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gens, 493 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1974);
Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1971).
45. See Adamson, 700 F.2d at 965.
46. United States v. Gens, 493 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1974). In Gens the borrower planned
to turn over the proceeds of the loan to a third party who otherwise would not have been
able to procure a loan. Because several bank officers knew of this arrangement, the court
could have deemed the act of lending a reckless disregard of the bank's interests. Id. at 222.
The First Circuit, however, held that the borrower's financial capability rebutted any evi-
dence sufficient to convict the officers under the higher mens rea standard of knowledge. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 1971).
50. The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692 (11th Cir. 1984),
upheld the conviction of the owners of a controlling interest in an Alabama bank who know-
ingly, and in contravention of both bank and FDIC policy, arranged for the issuance of
several exceedingly high loans to themselves and corporations they owned. The court gave
several reasons for its decision: (1) the accused had access to daily reports on the status of
the loans; (2) the accused knew that local banking policy and FDIC policy prohibited the
loans; and (3) the accused voluntarily approved and accepted loans that were above the
allowable limits. Id. at 702.
51. The Fifth Circuit also clearly rejected the recklessness standard. See United States
v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983); infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discuss-
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lessness mens rea standard, 52 demonstrate conflicting inter-
pretations of the intent standard that section 656 requires.
III. RECENT DECISIONS
Within a two week period during March 1983, three circuit
courts rendered decisions concerning the appropriate mens rea
standard for the Misapplication Statute. In United States v. Han-
sen"3 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a section 656 conviction on the
grounds that "reckless disregard of the interests of the bank is
equivalent to intent to injure."54 The Fourth Circuit, in United
States v. Luke,55 determined that a bank employee's general
knowledge of a de facto loan to a third party rather than to the
named debtor satisfied the mens rea requirement of section 656.58
Finally, in United States v. Adamson,57 the Fifth Circuit adopted
the purportedly uniform rule that the appropriate mens rea stan-
dard for a section 656 conviction is knowledge and overruled the
recklessness standard that the Fifth Circuit previously had em-
ployed in section 656 suits.5 8
A. United States v. Hansen
In United States v. Hansen9 the defendant, acting in his ca-
pacity as a bank lending officer, exceeded statutory lending limits,
arranged fraudulent loans without the consent of the named bor-
rowers, and retained a portion of the fraudulent loans for himself
pursuant to an unlawful agreement.6 0 In affirming the conviction,
the Seventh Circuit found sufficient evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that the defendant had acted knowingly and that "the
ing Adamson).
52. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have adopted the recklessness standard.
See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thomas,
610 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 868 (1978).
53. 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
54. Hansen, 701 F.2d at 1218.
55. 701 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
56. Luke, 701 F.2d at 1107.
57. 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 116 (1983); see infra notes 78-95
and accompanying text.
58. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 968; see, e.g., United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Reynolds, 573 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wilson,
500 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. White v. United States, 420 U.S. 977
(1975).
59. 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 1217.
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natural result of his conduct would be to injure and defraud the
bank."'" The court, however, did not base its decision solely upon
the knowing conduct of the defendant. Without explanation, the
court introduced the recklessness standard and equated it with the
requisite intent to injure or defraud.2 Typical of many court opin-
ions that have tangled with the section 656 mens rea problem, the
Seventh Circuit used the concepts of knowledge and recklessness
interchangeably and failed to enunciate a clear mens rea
standard. 3
The Seventh Circuit did not need to resort to a recklessness
standard to affirm the defendant's conviction. The court had con-
cluded that the jury instructions adequately explained the knowl-
edge standard 4 and that sufficient evidence existed of the defen-
dant's purposeful arrangement to convert loans to his personal use
through kickbacks.65 The facts clearly supported a proper finding
of section 656 willful misapplication without introduction of the
recklessness standard. The Seventh Circuit, however, in affirming
the defendant's conviction, inexplicably included the lesser mens
rea standard of recklessness, rather than the more stringent re-
quirement of knowledge, as the basis for the decision.
B. United States v. Luke
In United States v. Luke66 the defendants were neither bank
officers nor bank employees. Because of their alleged affiliation
with a bank lending official, however, the prosecutor brought
charges against the defendants under section 656 through the aidor
and abettor provision of Title 18.67 The defendants, acting under a
61. Id. at 1218-19.
62. The Seventh Circuit stated that the "[r]equisite intent 'exists whenever the defen-
dant acts knowingly and the result of his conduct would be to injure or defraud the bank,
regardless of his motive. . . . Reckless disregard of the interests of the bank is equivalent
to intent to injure or defraud.'" Id. at 1219 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v.
Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1024 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978)).
63. See United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1978) (pre-Hansen decision in
which the court interchangeably used knowledge and recklessness standards without ade-
quate distinction).
64. The trial judge had instructed the jury: "Intent to defraud a bank exists if the
officer or employee acts knowingly and if the natural result of his conduct would be to injure
and defraud the bank, even though that may not have been his motive." Hansen, 701 F.2d
at 1218.
65. Id. at 1219.
66. 701 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1983).
67. The "aidor and abettor" provision of Title 18 states, "Whoever commits an offense
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its com-
mission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982).
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plan that the bank officer devised, procured bank funds and gave
them to a third party debtor, who used the money to repay his
defaulted loans. 8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of
the two defendants without fully considering the mens rea element
of the Misapplication Statute.6
The Luke court characterized the defendant's loan scheme as
one of the three willful misapplication situations that the First Cir-
cuit outlined in United States v. Gens.70 The Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that the Luke scenario fit neatly into the Gens third cate-
gory, "in which bank officials assured the named debtor, regardless
of his financial capabilities, that they would look for repayment
only to the third party who actually received the loan proceeds." '71
The Gens categories, however, illustrate situations concerning the
knowing conduct of bank officers, while Luke addressed the con-
duct of commercial loan recipients who may or may not have
known that the bank was not holding them ultimately liable for
the loans in question.
The defendants in Luke characterized the loan as two legiti-
mate transactions: a bona fide loan by the bank to the defendants'
company followed by a gift from the company to a third party
debtor.72 Admittedly, the Luke court could have concluded that
the bank officer had known to whom he would look for repayment
of the defendants' loan, but no evidence existed to indicate that
the loan recipients had known whom the bank ultimately would
hold financially responsible. Thus, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly
analogized the situation in Luke, which concerned the knowledge
68. Luke, 701 F.2d at 1105-06.
69. Id. at 1108.
70. 493 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1974). The Gens court explained:
The cases of this type in which willful misapplication has been found fall into three
general categories. First, those in which bank officials knew the named debtor was
either fictitious or wholly unaware that his name was being used .... Second, cases in
which bank officials knew the named debtor was financially incapable of repaying the
loan whose proceeds he passed on to the third party. . . .Third, cases in which bank
officials assured the named debtor, regardless of his financial capabilities, that they
would look for repayment only to the third party who actually received the loan pro-
ceeds: in other words where the debtor allowed only his name to be used, enabling the
bank officials to grant a de facto loan to a third party to whom the bank was unwilling
to grant a formal loan.
Id. at 221-22 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Stokes, 471 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.
1973) (fictitious debtor); United States v. Moraites, 456 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972) (de facto loan); Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.
1935) (financially incapable debtor), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1936).
71. Luke, 701 F.2d at 1107 (quoting Gens, 493 F.2d at 221-22).
72. Luke, 701 F.2d at 1107.
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of the named debtor, with the willful misapplication scenario of
Gens, which addressed the knowledge of the bank employee.
The Luke court only superficially addressed the criminal in-
tent component of section 656. In fact, the cases that the court
cited to support a finding of intent concerned the mens rea neces-
sary under the statute to convict bank employees for knowing acts
and discussed neither the distinction between knowing and reck-
less conduct nor the liability of nonemployee loan recipients.7 3 In
addressing the mens rea requirement, the Fourth Circuit was con-
tent to find a "sham" loan, as the Gens court defined the term, 4
and that the loan had "temporarily deprive[d] the bank of posses-
sion, control or use of its funds. '7 5 After establishing the existence
of the loan and the defendants' affiliation with the bank officer, the
court felt that the prosecution had established the crime of misap-
plication. 6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit not only treated section 656
as a strict liability offense, 7 but also extended the Gens analysis to
nonbank personnel.
C. United States v. Adamson
In United States v. Adamson 8 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, considered the legislative history of section 656, the views of
the other circuit courts, and the constitutional issues surrounding
the Misapplication Statute. The court reversed the former holding
in Adamson and overruled the recklessness standard that the Fifth
Circuit had employed in previous section 656 cases. 79 The defen-
dant in Adamson, a bank lending officer, had authorized a substan-
tial loan to a corporation that was under the control of two indi-
viduals.80 These individuals were the actual beneficiaries of the
loan, even though their financial status would have barred them
from procuring a loan through normal procedures.81 The defendant
banker admitted that he did not expect the corporation to repay
73. The court relied on United States v. King, 484 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974), and United States v. Moraites, 456 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972). Both King and Moraites concerned situations of knowing con-
duct by bank officers or directors.
74. Gens, 493 F.2d at 221.
75. Luke, 701 F.2d at 1108.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
78. 665 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on reh'g, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
79. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58.
80. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 955.
81. Id.
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the loan, but believed that the individual beneficiaries were to re-
pay the debt."2 When the bank failed, the government prosecuted
the bank officer and the two beneficiaries of the loan under section
656.3
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit the defendant challenged the
trial judge's jury instruction equating recklessness with section 656
criminal intent.8 4 The initial Fifth Circuit panel, after examining
controlling precedent in the circuit, 5 affirmed the conviction."'
Even though the court was uneasy with its holding, it nonetheless
determined that section 656 "imposes only a mens rea standard of
recklessness.187
Upon rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit held that knowledge
was the appropriate mens rea standard for the Misapplication
Statute. 8 The court, after examining section 656's predecessor
statute, found that the knowledge standard of the predecessor stat-
ute carried over to section 656.89 The Fifth Circuit further deter-
82. Id.
83. Adamson raises the fear that if recklessness is sufficient to satisfy § 656 mens rea,
then federal prosecutors randomly will prosecute bank officials under the Misapplication
Statute. Especially following large bank failures, federal prosecutors may justify § 656 prose-
cutions of bank lending officers in an attempt to restore public faith in the banking industry
by punishing the bank for making risky loans. Courts that tolerate these suits seriously will
impair the banks' credit allocation function. See supra notes 42-43.
84. Adamson, 665 F.2d at 651. In particular, the defendant challenged the instruction:
"I charge you that the element of criminal intent necessary for conviction for a willful mis-
application of bank funds is not fulfilled by a mere showing of indiscretion or foolhardiness
on the part of the bank officer. His conduct must amount to reckless disregard of the bank's
interests. . . ." Id.
85. The court found precedent for the recklessness standard in a line of cases culmi-
nating with United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979). The defendant in Wel-
liver had objected to a jury instruction that was almost identical to the charge in Adamson.
The Welliver court upheld the instruction after determining that recklessness satisfied
criminal intent for § 656 willful misapplication. Welliver, 601 F.2d at 210.
86. Adamson, 665 F.2d at 654-55.
87. Id. at 656. The court was uncomfortable with its decision:
Several factors contribute to our difficulty with this holding: the inconsistent mens rea
requirement of the related statute § 1005, the clear holding of cases construing § 656 as
requiring purpose and the legislative history suggesting that § 656 was not intended to
change the substance of the law, the uniform holdings of the other circuits construing §
656 to require either purpose or knowledge, and the strong dictum to the same effect in
Fifth Circuit cases.
Id.
88. United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 116 (1983).
89. Id. at 956-57. The predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982) was 12 U.S.C.
§ 592 (1946) (REV. STAT. § 5209 (2d ed. 1878)) (repealed 1948), which was substantially
similar to the current statute, but included the language "with intent to injure or defraud."
See supra note 10 (text of § 5209).
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mined that the recklessness standard differed from the uniform
standard of knowledge, which all the other circuits had adopted.90
The court also recognized that allowing courts to presume the req-
uisite mens rea standard from a finding of recklessness would vio-
late constitutional due process.9 ' Finally, the court compared sec-
tion 656 with a companion statute, section 1005,92 and concluded
that the higher mens rea of knowledge, applicable in all section
1005 cases, also should prevail in section 656 cases.9 3 Based on
these findings, the Fifth Circuit overruled earlier precedent sup-
porting the recklessness standard 4 and held that "[i]n order to
convict a defendant for willfully misapplying funds with intent to
injure or defraud a bank, the government must prove that the de-
fendant knowingly participated in a deceptive or fraudulent
transaction. ' '95
90. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 957-63. The Fifth Circuit's determination that other circuits
uniformly had adopted knowledge as the appropriate mens rea standard in § 656 cases was
misleading. Other circuits have held and continue to hold that reckless disregard of the
interests of the bank is equivalent to intent to injure or defraud the bank. See, e.g., United
States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983); cases cited supra note 33. The Fifth Circuit
did acknowledge that "several circuit court cases discussing the mental state required under
section 656 contain loose references to recklessness," but distinguished these cases on the
ground that the courts were referring to recklessness as a justified inference of intent.
Adamson, 700 F.2d at 961-62 & n.14. Allowing recklessness as an inference of intent that is
necessary to establish mens rea in presumed intent crimes, however, is tantamount to creat-
ing a presumption of knowledge that is based on recklessness. R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at
748.
91. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
92. Section 1005 provides in relevant part-
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of any Federal Reserve
bank, member bank, national bank or insured bank, without authority from the direc-
tors of such bank, issues or puts in circulation any notes of such bank; or
Whoever, without such authority, makes, draws, issues, puts forth, or assigns any
certificate of deposit, draft, order, bill of exchange, acceptance, note, debenture, bond,
or other obligation, or mortgage, judgment or decree; or
Whoever makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of such bank
with intent to injure or defraud such bank, or any other company, body politic or cor-
porate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of such bank, or the Comp-
troller of the Currency, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or any agent or
examiner appointed to examine the affairs of such bank, or the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982).
93. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 964-65.
94. See supra note 85.
95. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 965 (emphasis in original).
The most recent Fifth Circuit case to discuss the § 656 mens rea, however, casts doubt
on the effect of the Adamson ruling that the jury cannot infer knowledge from reckless
conduct. In United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
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IV. Two POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A flexible statutory scheme is necessary to discourage insider
misconduct in the banking industry because of the numerous situ-
ations in which a violation may occur.96 The Misapplication Stat-
ute has provided federal enforcement officials with a flexible tool
for prosecuting a wide range of insider activity. The judicial sys-
tem, however, has not achieved this flexibility without cost. By
adopting the lesser mens rea standard of recklessness in section
656 felony convictions, courts have equated unintentional viola-
tions of section 656 with premeditated felonies such as embezzle-
ment and fraud.97 Courts must begin to recognize the varying de-
grees of culpability that exist under section 656 and employ a
mens rea standard commensurate with the alleged violation.
Two possible solutions exist to alleviate the problem of apply-
ing the Misapplication Statute unfairly to alleged violators who
possess a lesser mens rea than knowledge. First, as a long range
solution, Congress should pass legislation that defines several kinds
of mens rea under section 656. This legislation should provide the
courts with the means to distinguish beween different degrees of
culpability. Second, as a more immediate solution, the courts
should adopt a uniform standard for evaluating the section 656
mens rea.
A. The Long-Term Solution: A Tri-Level Culpability Standard
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws has recommended a revision of Title 18 that would establish
three levels of violations under regulatory statutes such as section
656.98 The Commission's position has gained support among critics
966 (1984), the Fifth Circuit surprisingly held that a jury may infer § 656 mens rea from
reckless conduct. Id. at 1355. If the Cauble decision is the proper interpretation of the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Adamson, Cauble seriously weakens the Adamson court's strong rejec-
tion of the recklessness standard.
As in Luke, the facts supporting the § 656 conviction in Adamson presented a question-
able basis for finding a willful misapplication of bank funds with intent to injure or defraud
the bank. The disparate results in Luke and Adamson evidence the confusion that still sur-
rounds the Misapplication Statute and the different mens rea standards necessary to up-
hold a conviction in the various circuit courts.
96. See supra note 7.
97. Compare United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant ar-
ranged fraudulent loans in return for "kickbacks") with United States v. Luke, 701 F.2d
1104 (4th Cir. 1983) (defendants procured loans from the bank and used them to repay the
defaulted loans of a third party debtor).
98. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FI-
NAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 74-75 (1971)
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of section 656's current language.9 The proposal distinguishes be-
tween traditional crimes that "are universally recognized outrages
and threats to common security" 110 and regulatory crimes, which
are practices that are malum prohibitum.'0 Because the Commis-
sion believes that not all violators of regulatory offenses are deserv-
ing of conviction and punishment unless they possess traditional
criminal intent, the Commission delineated three categories of reg-
ulatory offenses, each requiring a different punishment.10 2
The first level of regulatory offenses under the proposed legis-
lation would include nonculpable violations and would require
compliance with a low mens rea standard. 0 3 In the context of the
Misapplication Statute, nonculpable violators would include bank
officers who unknowingly violate lending limits 0 4 or otherwise act
recklessly. Federal prosecutors could use this lower level category
to pursue bank officers and loan recipients whose reckless conduct
has caused lending irregularities. 05 Because of the nonculpable na-
ture of the violation, however, violators in this category would be
subject to the lowest degree of punishment. 06
Bank personnel who willfully violate the provisions of section
656 would be liable under the second regulatory category. 0 7
Willfullness under the proposed statute would apply to both con-
duct and the knowledge that the conduct is impermissible.'05 Fed-
eral prosecutors would have to prove that the defendant willfully
misapplied funds and that he knew that his conduct was unlawful.
This heightened knowledge requirement would insure that the jury
(hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT).
99. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 6, at 844; Morse, supra note 10, at 753-55.
100. UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 1
WORKING PAPERS 403 (1970) (hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS). The Commission lists
homicide, rape, and robbery as examples of traditional crimes. Id. at 403-04.
101. Malum prohibitum crimes are illegal only because a statute prohibits them. State
v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 592, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (1905); W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 6, at 29 (1972). Examples of malum prohibitum crimes include making
false statements on official reports and generally violating business regulations. See WORK-
ING PAPERS, supra note 100, at 410-18.
102. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 75-76 (comment to § 1006).
103. See id. at 74 (§ 1006(2)(a)).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Christo, 614 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1980); 12 U.S.c. §
375(a) (1982).
105. For example, this standard might be appropriate for prosecuting third party of-
fenders such as the defendants in Luke. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
106. The Commission suggests that these violators would be guilty of an infraction
and receive nonpenal sanctions for their conduct. FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 74-76.
107. Id. at 74 (§ 1006(7)(b)).
108. Id. at 76.
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considers the defendant's motive and knowledge when determining
whether he possessed the requisite intent to injure or defraud the
bank."9 The statute would include a rebuttable presumption that
the banker engaging in the regulated activity knew about the stat-
ute.1 0 Most of the current violations of section 656 would fall into
this category."'
The third category would apply to individuals who act will-
fully and in persistent disobedience of the regulating authority. 2
Prosecutors of a third level offense would have to prove not only
that the individual acted willfully but also that the conduct oc-
curred over a period of time." 3 Planned kickback schemes," 4
check kiting fraud,1 5 bribery attempts," 6 and other blatant exam-
ples of criminal insider misconduct fall into this category. Predict-
ably, the Commission would require courts to impose the most se-
vere penalties on third level offenders because of the high standard
of intent that the prosecution must establish." 7 Federal prosecu-
tors, however, should not have difficulty meeting the knowing or
purposeful mens rea standard when attempting to convict bank in-
siders for planned and deliberate criminal activity because written
or oral evidence of the crime most likely will be available in situa-
109. This model would conform to the standards for determining mens rea that the
American Law Institute outlined in the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b),
(8) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
110. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE 69-70 (1970). This statutory presumption
would encourage bankers and other people connected with the banking industry to be aware
of potential criminal liabilities.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Luke, 701 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 116 (1983); United States v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 977 (1975); United States v. Fortunato, 402 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969); Logsdon v. United States, 253 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958).
112. FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 75 (§ 1006(2)(c)).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983); supra text ac-
companying notes 59-61 (discussing Hansen).
115. The Eighth Circuit recently defined check kiting:
Check kiting is a plan wherein one or more parties, utilizing checking accounts at two
or more banks systematically exchange checks of similar amounts. Utilizing the delay
or lag time as the checks are cleared through the Federal Reserve System, an inflated
and uncollected balance is created and maintained at the banks. While checks drawn
against uncollected funds are in the clearing process, the parties have the use of the
deposited but uncollected funds, which make up the "float."
United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281, 1284 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980);
see also United States v. Mullins, 355 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976).
117. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 75 (§ 1006(2)(c)).
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tions involving persistent misconduct.
The Commission's proposed revisions to Title 18 would pro-
vide flexibility in section 656 cases and would equate the level of
punishment with the defendant's level of mens rea. As one critic of
section 656 has argued, "it cannot be gainsaid that the banker who
has embezzled his bank's funds outright is, under the present stat-
ute, treated equally with those who have merely exceeded the con-
fines of prudent banking, for admittedly personal gain, but with no
risk that the bank would lose the funds." ' s The tri-level approach
that the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws advocates could serve as a model for redrafting the Misappli-
cation Statute."" Congress then could tailor section 656 to provide
for prosecutorial flexibility and to establish a just system of retri-
bution in which the sanction corresponds to the degree of criminal
responsibility.
B. The Short-Term Solution: Judicial Uniformity
The circuit courts have applied the Misapplication Statute in-
consistently. 20 Despite the Adamson court's declaration that the
circuit courts uniformly have adopted knowledge as the appropri-
ate mens rea standard,' 2 ' the circuit courts interpret the requisite
intent standard of section 656 differently. 22 Equitable treatment
of all potential section 656 violators requires the application of a
uniform standard of judging criminal intent under the statute. Cir-
cuit courts, therefore, must decide whether reckless disregard of
the bank's interests is the equivalent of the intent to injure or de-
fraud the bank.
Courts have established that the specific intent to injure or
defraud the bank is an element of the crime of misapplication. 123
The Supreme Court has determined that the prosecution may sat-
isfy this element of a criminal offense by demonstrating either
118. Cox, supra note 6, at 844.
119. Adapting the Commission's proposal to serve the interests of § 656 would require
a major legislative effort including the establishment of new punishment standards and the
possible drafting of two new statutes: one statute providing for a misdemeanor offense and
the other providing for a felony offense.
120. See supra note 90; supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying note 90.
122. See supra notes 59-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits' approaches).
123. See Seals v. United States, 221 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Logsdon, 132 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Ky. 1955), af'd, 253 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958).
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knowing or purposeful conduct.1 24 Circuit courts that currently al-
low recklessness to satisfy section 656 criminal intent, therefore,
may be conflicting with Supreme Court precedent. 25 At the very
least, acceptance of a recklessness standard under the Misapplica-
tion Statute contradicts the Supreme Court's interpretation of spe-
cific intent.
Strong policy reasons justify a uniform rejection of the reck-
lessness standard. The business of banking requires that people
124. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (discussing the appropriate
mens rea standard for satisfying the statutory requirement that an escaped prisoner must
intend to avoid confinement). The Bailey Court relied on the traditional approach to spe-
cific intent crimes. The Court quoted from the criminal law treatise of Professors LaFave
and Scott: "In a general sense, 'purpose' corresponds loosely with the common-law concept
of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent."
Id. at 405 (citing W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 101, § 28, at 201-02).
The Court also relied on the new approach to specific intent crimes that the American
Law Institute adopted in the Model Penal Code. Section 2.02(2) of the Code defines the
general requirements of culpability:
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result;
and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is prac-
tically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
125. One interpretation of United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), is that the
Supreme Court held that specific intent crimes require purposeful conduct.
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who make decisions about credit allocation and asset valuation
base their decisions on tangible as well as intangible factors." 6 A
banker who does not take risks is not serving a productive societal
function. 127 The Fifth Circuit, in advocating the uniform rejection
of the recklessness standard for section 656, stated: "[W]e do not
believe that Congress intended that bank employees engaged in
routine transactions, such as making book entries or making loans,
should be exposed to felony prosecutions unless they act
knowingly."' 128
The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting the recklessness standard for
the prosecution of section 656 cases, made several persuasive ob-
servations. The knowledge or purpose that courts require for mens
rea under the predecessor statute to section 656, absent congres-
sional intent to the contrary, should carry over to section 656.129 In
addition, the mens rea requirement of knowledge that courts uni-
formly apply to section 1005, the companion statute to section 656,
also should be applied to section 656.130 The similar substantive
provisions of the two statutes logically call for similar mens rea
requirements. Finally, permitting courts to hold that recklessness
satisfies the mens rea test of section 656 violates constitutional due
process. 13 1 The remaining ten circuits should rely on the same pol-
icy reasons that the Fifth Circuit used to reject the recklessness
standard. 132
Admittedly, if courts uniformly reject the recklessness stan-
dard and adopt the knowledge test for section 656 intent, prosecu-
tors would have more difficulty obtaining section 656 convictions
under this heightened mens rea standard.13 3 In particular, the gov-
ernment lacks the flexibility to prosecute in cases in which the de-
126. See generally M. MAYER, supra note 43, at 296-357 (discussing the credit alloca-
tion function of bankers).
127. See id. at 296.
128. United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 965 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
116 (1983).
129. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
132. See Adamson, 700 F.2d at 965. In the most recent case to rule on the § 656 mens
rea standard, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Adamson to
support a determination that "the appropriate mens rea standard for section 656 is knowl-
edge." United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 702 (11th Cir. 1984); see supra note 50.
133. Assuming the circuit courts restricted § 656 mens rea to knowledge, federal pros-
ecutors would experience difficulty in obtaining convictions in situations arising from lend-
ing irregularities because lending irregularities are unlikely to indicate the accused's intent.
See generally O'Malley, supra note 4, at 108-10 (discussing cases arising from lending
irregularities).
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fendant acted recklessly, but the facts do not reveal the degree of
his knowledge or intent. 34 These borderline defendants, however,
should not be subject to the severe criminal penalties that section
656 imposes. Numerous statutes already provide civil liabilities for
acts of maladministration by bank personnel. 135 In fact, limiting
the number of prosecutions under section 656 to knowing viola-
tions might spur Congress to redraft a more comprehensive version
of the Misapplication Statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The most immediate problem facing bankers, attorneys, and
judges addressing section 656 questions is the inconsistent applica-
tion of the mens rea element of the Misapplication Statute. The
most recent circuit court decisions interpreting the Misapplication
Statute illustrate the lack of uniformity in the application of the
section 656 mens rea standard. Most bankers are unaware of the
potential criminal liability that they may face for reckless misap-
plication of funds. 3 6 Even for bankers who are aware of potential
section 656 liability, the fact that current banking practices regu-
larly transcend state borders accentuates the need for uniform reg-
ulation of banking conduct with national judicial enforcement
standards.
In an effort to ensure fair prosecution and adequate control of
the wide variety of illegal practices that occur in the banking in-
dustry, Congress should amend section 656 to allow prosecutors
greater flexibility when they charge bankers with criminal viola-
tions. Until Congress decides to redraft section 656, however, the
courts should strive to meet the short-run objective of establishing
a uniform standard of culpability. To promote an efficient banking
134. See, e.g., United States v. Luke, 701 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 116 (1983).
135. Statutes imposing civil liabilities on bank personnel for insider misconduct in-
clude: 12 U.S.C. §§ 84 (violations of bank lending limits), 371 (limitations on real estate
loans), 371c (restrictions on transactions with banking affiliates), 375a (limitations on loans
to executive officers of banks), 376 (limitations on rates of interest paid to bank directors)
(1982).
136. For example, the American Banking Association's handbook for bank officials er-
roneously assures bank personnel that to commit the violation of misapplication of bank
funds, "the misapplication must be 'willful.'" SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, OVERDRAFTS AND CORRESPONDENT BANKING PRACTIcES 677 (Comm. Print
1977).
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system, the courts should adopt knowledge as the minimum mens
rea standard for sustaining criminal convictions under the Misap-
plication Statute.
WILLIAM J. HOLLEY, II

